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NATO-Russia Relations after the 
Newport Summit 
Reassurance, Cooperation and Security Guarantees 
Margarete Klein / Markus Kaim 
A key aspect of the NATO summit in Newport (Wales) was the reaction of the alliance to 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its destabilisation of Eastern Ukraine. However, 
apart from the decision to create a high-readiness force, and an action plan for Eastern 
Europe, heads of state and government did not focus enough on the long-term pros-
pects for NATOʼs relationship with Russia. 
 
Until the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, the 
Atlantic alliance had ambitious goals for its 
relations with Russia. There are several 
founding documents and offers of coopera-
tion to testify to this. The political frame-
work for their bilateral relationship is the 
“Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Co-
operation and Security between NATO and 
the Russian Federationˮ of May 1997. In this 
document, which reflects their cooperative 
spirit during the 1990s, the two sides not 
only agreed upon numerous areas of co-
operation, but also described their view of 
one another. NATO and Russia no longer 
saw themselves as opponents, striving in-
stead to build a “strong, stable and endur-
ing partnershipˮ. In return for NATOʼs first 
round of eastern expansion, which was 
already under way, Moscow was given the 
political assurance that – under the circum-
stances prevalent at that time – the alliance 
would not transfer nuclear weapons or de-
ploy substantial numbers of troops to its 
new member states.  
In 2002 the two sides deepened their 
cooperation still further by creating the 
NATO-Russia Council (NRC). This allowed 
NATO members and Russia not only to 
discuss a wide range of security issues, but 
to try and resolve them together. Ultimate-
ly, the cooperation was accorded high pri-
ority in NATOʼs Strategic Concept of 2010. 
The governments of NATO states defined 
cooperative security in the Euro-Atlantic 
area (i.e. security cooperation with non-
NATO countries) as the allianceʼs third 
core task, after mutual defence and inter-
national crisis management. 
Why the “Strategic Partnershipˮ 
Failed 
The fact that NATOʼs desired “strategic 
partnershipˮ did not come to fruition is 
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 partly due to the persistent asymmetry of 
power between the USA and Russia, but 
more particularly due to the lack of a stable 
foundation of common interests. Russia 
and NATO have cooperated very closely in 
some areas – most notably on international 
crisis management (especially in Afghani-
stan), counter-terrorism, disarmament and 
arms control. However, the NRC has lacked 
a “showcase projectˮ. Hopes that limited 
cooperation over missile defence could 
improve the quality of relations between 
Russia and NATO were dashed, when the 
two sidesʼ expectations as to the scope of 
the cooperation could not be reconciled. 
The “strategic partnershipˮ also failed 
because there was no shared concept for 
the development of bilateral relations or 
the intended Euro-Atlantic security com-
munity. Moscow demands an equal say and 
power of veto over all the continentʼs key 
areas of security policy. Moreover, the Rus-
sian leadership insists that the post-Soviet 
space should be recognised as Russiaʼs 
exclusive sphere of influence. NATO cannot 
accept this as it contravenes basic princi-
ples, such as the right of free choice to form 
alliances as laid down, for instance, in the 
Charter of Paris. 
This conflict over the European political 
order, which has dimensions of both politi-
cal power and ideology, has intensified dur-
ing Putinʼs third term in office. The Russian 
president now justifies his claim to leader-
ship in the post-Soviet space in terms of 
civilisation, casting Moscow in the role of a 
protective power for the Russian-speaking 
community. This calls into question the in-
violability of state borders in the post-Soviet 
space. Moreover, Moscow relies less on the 
rule of law to achieve its interests that it 
does on political, economic and military 
power. In pursuing its Eurasian integration 
projects in general, and in its Ukraine policy 
in particular, Russia aims to reach a posi-
tion of strength from which to forcibly re-
negotiate the Euro-Atlantic security com-
munity to take more fully into account 
Russian interests and “red linesˮ. This “trans-
nationalisationˮ of Russian security policy 
presents an entirely new set of challenges 
to Western security policy makers, who 
view the Euro-Atlantic area almost exclu-
sively in terms of established nation states.  
Consequences of the Ukraine Crisis 
Since Russia has annexed Crimea, and 
seems determined to destabilise Eastern 
Ukraine, for the time being it has lost its 
status as a strategic partner of NATO. In 
April 2014, in response to Russiaʼs actions, 
foreign ministers of the NATO states sus-
pended all military and civil cooperation 
between NATO and Russia below the level 
of the NATO Council. Some members of the 
alliance have even expressed the view that 
NATO-Russian relations should be cut off 
entirely. However, this has not become the 
majority position. On the one hand the 
argument still prevails that if NATO coun-
tries also stop abiding by existing obliga-
tions, they will risk losing the credibility of 
their own security policy. 
On the other hand, NATOʼs long-term 
view is still that of an order which (re-)in-
tegrates Russia into the Euro-Atlantic secu-
rity community. In line with this view, 
cooperation should only be temporarily 
reduced. However, this is largely a symbolic 
policy as many governments continue to 
cooperate with the Russian leadership out-
side the NATO framework, for instance on 
energy supplies and international counter-
terrorism issues. 
Possible Scenarios for 
NATO-Russia Relations 
Since the partnership model for relations 
between Russia and NATO has failed, the 
alliance is faced with the question of how to 
shape its future relationship with Moscow. 
There are three courses of action available:  
Containment 
Proponents of a policy of containment 
believe that Moscow can only be prevented 
from pursuing its aggressive policies by 
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 meeting force with force. This would mean 
abandoning military caution with regard to 
the permanent stationing of troops and 
equipment in new NATO states. It would 
also mean expanding NATOʼs collective 
defence capability against Russia.  
However, those who defend this position 
are overlooking the risks and limitations of 
such a strategy: although it would deter 
Russia from a military attack against the 
Baltic states or Poland, it is unclear whether 
it would prevent the use of destabilisation 
strategies – such as the mobilisation of 
Russian minorities, irregular militia opera-
tions, propaganda, or economic sanctions.  
Above all, a policy of containment does 
not solve the fundamental problem of com-
petition over the political order of the post-
Soviet space. As long as Ukraine, Georgia 
and Moldova remain outside of NATO, their 
powers of deterrent will be too weak to 
protect themselves effectively. However, if 
these countries were granted accelerated 
membership, the current conflict between 
Russia and NATO would only become more 
entrenched, making cooperation practically 
impossible even on questions of common 
interest.  
Peaceful Coexistence 
Another option would be to return to the 
model of “peaceful coexistenceˮ associated 
with the Cold War period. Peaceful coexis-
tence works on the idea that there is no 
prospect of integrating Russia into the 
Euro-Atlantic framework of institutions and 
principles of behaviour. However, it is 
assumed that the two sides can agree not 
to resort to military action in their conflict, 
as this would be damaging to both. 
At the same time, peaceful coexistence 
means marking out and acknowledging 
one anotherʼs sphere of influence. NATO 
would almost certainly not be able to go 
along with this, as it would mean giving up 
the principles and norms which it agreed 
with Russia in 1990. The notion of a stateʼs 
sovereignty over its foreign policy and 
territorial integrity would then only apply 
to NATO members, and not to countries 
falling within the Russian sphere of in-
fluence. Thus the cost of trying to achieve 
security for NATO would be borne by 
mutually neighbouring states; yet this 
scenario would also cost the alliance its 
credibility and diminish its influence.  
Reassurance, Cooperation and Security 
Guarantees 
It seems, then, that the stability of the Euro-
Atlantic area would benefit from a strategy 
which provides reassurance to eastern 
NATO member states whilst at the same 
time keeping the offer of cooperation with 
Russia open. 
This reassurance does not mean relin-
quishing existing political obligations 
under the founding act, although that 
certainly remains an option if Russia con-
tinues its aggressive destabilisation of other 
states. However, channels of communica-
tion and forms of cooperation which serve 
common interests should be maintained in 
principle.  
A stumbling block in all this is the 
Crimean question. Yet there may be a way 
to isolate – politically and legally – the 
issue of this territoryʼs annexation, so that 
cooperation remains possible. A model for 
this kind of policy is the way Western 
governments cooperated with the Soviet 
leadership, despite not recognising the 
Soviet Unionʼs annexation of the Baltic 
states in 1940. However, as long as Moscow 
sticks to its course of subverting and de-
stabilising Eastern Ukraine, the position 
of those NATO states who want to freeze 
cooperation with Moscow, and are no 
longer prepared to adhere to agreements 
they have made, will be strengthened. This 
is easy to observe in the current triangular 
relationship: unless Russia changes its poli-
cy towards Ukraine, a cooperative attitude 
on the part of NATO towards Russia will be 
unimaginable. 
A rapprochement would require not just 
an institutional framework outside the NRC 
(and the OSCE could play an important role 
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 in this); it would also require the Russian 
leadership to make concessions to NATO 
over several issues of security policy which 
have been controversial in the past. A will-
ingness to compromise in these areas could 
really open doors, especially in relation to 
missile defence or reducing tactical nuclear 
weapons stocks.  
However, if the conflict over the political 
order of the post-Soviet space is not re-
solved, cooperation will remain shaky. The 
dilemma for NATO is that on the one hand 
it wants to avoid the appearance of deci-
sions being taken over the heads of the 
countries involved (which means it can 
only agree to a solution which also has the 
consent of Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova); 
but on the other hand it cannot simply 
bypass this process by granting those coun-
tries NATO membership, as this should 
depend solely on whether they fulfil the 
membership criteria. The “external factor 
of Russiaˮ should have no influence over 
such decisions, either as a veto power or as 
a justification for hurriedly (perhaps pre-
maturely) allowing new members to join. 
It is therefore worth considering ways to 
create security in Russia and NATOʼs shared 
neighbourhood without granting formal 
NATO membership to the countries in ques-
tion. Neutrality has often been proposed as 
a solution in this debate; however, this 
would only increase security for those 
countries if it included specific agreements 
and guarantees.  
Given that Moscowʼs annexation of 
Crimea violated the Budapest Memoran-
dum, Russian security guarantees are no 
longer very convincing. Although Western 
assurances have also become questionable 
as a result, NATO should provide security 
guarantees to the relevant countries with-
out actually granting them full member-
ship of the alliance. Rather than collective 
defence, NATO could commit to providing 
clearly stipulated help in case of an attack, 
such as swift deliveries of weapons. The EU 
could also make a useful contribution here: 
its Association Agreement with Kiev is an 
expression of Ukraineʼs Western orienta-
tion, which the Russian leadership is seek-
ing to prevent. Any attempts, therefore, to 
make the agreement compatible with the 
Eurasian Economic Union would be helpful 
from a security policy perspective. 
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